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4. A person of defective senses is bound to the diligent use
of such senses as he has; and if his defects are such as to deprive
him of material aids to safety, which ordinary persons have, conduct may be negligent in him which would not be so in ordinary
persons.
5. In all cases the question of ordinary care is for the jury.
A. DAvis SMITH.
Hartford, Conn.
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The plaintiffs recovered judgment for breach of a contract, against Vr. and M.,
who were carrying on business in partnership as W., M. & Co. W. and M. became
insolvent, and the judgment was never satisfied. The plaintiffs afterwards discovered that H1.was jointly interested in the contract which they had entered into with
W. and M., and they brought a fresh action against H.
Ield (Lord PrEZA.cE dissenting), That the judgment recovered by the plaintiffs against W. and M., though unsatisfied, was a bar to their action against H.,
and that the Judicature Acts have made no change in the law on this subject.
King v. Hoare, 13 M. & W. 494, followed and approved.
Per Earl CAIRNs, C.-W. and M. were in the position of agents for W., M.
and H., as undisclosed principals, and the recovery of judgment against the agents
precluded the plaintiffs from afterwards suing the principals.

APPEAL by the plaintiffs against the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, reported Law Rep., 3 C. P. Div. 403.
The facts of the case are fully stated in the judgment delivered
by the Lord Chancellor.
The case was tried without a jury before HUDDLESTON, B., who
entered judgment for the plaintiffs; but this judgment was, on the

23d of July 1878, reversed by the Court of Appeals.
The plaintiffs appealed to this House.
Kay, Q. C., and Bowen ( Watkin Williams, Q. C., with them),
for the appellants.

Benjamin, Q. C., and lRigby, for the respondent.
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.- In the arguments before your lordships, and

in the judgments in the court below, the facts of this case were
presented in this form: it was said that a debt was due to the
appellants from Wilson, McLay & Co., and from the present respondent; that the debt was a partnership debt due from the three
jointly; that the appellants sued Wilson and McLay for the debt,
not then knowing that it was contracted by the respondent jointly
with them; that Wilson and McLay did not plead in abatement,
or otherwise object to the non-joinder of the respondent; that
judgment was obtained by the appellants against Wilson and
McLay, which judgment was, by reason of their insolvency, never
satisfied; and that the appellants, on discovering the respondent's
interest, brought an action against him for the debt. Two questions thereupon arose-first, was the judgment against Wilson and
McLay, even though unsatisfied, a bar to the action against the
respondent, Hamilton, according to the principles hitherto prevailing in the courts of common law? Secondly, was there not a
doctrine in courts of equity that all partnership debts are several
as well as joint, and if so, ought not that doctrine to be applied as
if the debt in this case was the sole debt of Hamilton, so as to prevent him from setting up in the action in which he is defendant,
the judgment recovered against Wilson and McLay? I will
express to your lordships what my opinion would be upon these
questions if they had to be determined in this case; but I would
first suggest that the facts, when properly considered, seem to
make it doubtful whether these questions really arise, and whether
the case should not be determined upon somewhat different considerations.
Between 1870 and 1874, the appellants were carrying on business in London as merchants. Wilson, McLay & Co., who were
carrying on business at Glasgow and London, undertook some
speculative shipments of old iron, and the appellants agreed to
provide them with the necessary funds through the acceptance and
discounting of bills of exchange. The respondent was, in fact,
interested in these shipments, though this fact was then unknown
to the appellants. He had agreed that the shipments should be
for the joint benefit of himself, and Wilson and McLay, the financial arrangements being managed by them. Therefore, Wilson and
McLay were, in reality, agents authorized to borrow money for the
undisclosed principals-Wilson, McLay, Hamilton. The persons
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advancing the money would have the right, on becoming aware of
Hamilton's interest, to sue all three as principals on the contract,
and if Hamilton were sued alone, he could plead in abatement the
non-joinder of Hamilton and McLay. The persons advancing
the money would also have the right to treat N'ilson and McLay
as the principals, and to sue them alone; and in such an action
Wilson and McLay would have no right to object to the non-joinder
of Hamilton. In the present case the transactions resulted in a
large sum of money becoming due to the appellants, for which they
sued Wilson and McLay, as they were entitled to do, whether
they knew of Hamilton's interest or not. It is true that they could
at any time before judgment have discontinued that action, and
brought a fresh one against all three principals; but if they did
not do so, Wilson and McLay could not have contended that they
were not the persons to be sued. The action went on, and resulted in the recovery of judgment against Wilson and McLay.
I take it to be clear, that when an agent contracts in his own
name for an undisclosed principal, the person with whom he contracts may sue the agent, or may sue the principal; but if he sues
the agent and recovers judgment, he cannot afterwards sue the
principal, even though the judgment against the agent does not
result in the satisfaction of the debt. If any authority for this
proposition is required, Priestley v. Pernie, 3 H. & C. 977, may
be mentioned, but the reasons for it are obvious; it would be contrary to every principle of justice, that the creditor who had seen,
and known, and dealt with, and given credit to the agent, should
be driven to sue the principal if he does not wish to do so; and,
on the other hand, it would be equally unjust that the creditor
should be prevented from suing the principal, if he wishes to do so,
when he discovers who has really had the benefit; but it would be
no less contrary to justice, that the creditor should be able to sue,
first the agent and then the principal, when it was never the intention of the parties that he should so. Again, if an action were
brought and judgment were recovered against the agent, the agent
would have a right of action for indemnity against his principal;
while, if the principal were liable to be sued, he would be vexed
with a double action. Moreover, if actions could be brought and
judgments recovered, first against the agent, and afterwards against
the principal, you would have two judgments in existence for the
same debt or cause of action; they would not necessarily be for
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the same amount, and there might be recoveries had, or liens and
charges created, by means of both, and upon the face of the judgment there would be no means of showing that they were both for
the same cause of action, and that satisfaction of one would be
satisfaction of both. I think that the appellants, when they sued
Wilson and McLay, and obtained a judgment against them, adopted
a course which was clearLy within their powers, and to which Wilson and McLay could have made no opposition, and that, by taking
this course, they exhausted their right of action, not necessarily by
any election between two courses open to them (which would imply
that, in order to an election, the fact of both courses being open
was known to them), but because the right of action which they
pursued could not, after judgment obtained, co-exist with a right
of action on the same facts against another person. If Wilson and
MeLay had been the agents, and Hamilton had been the undisclosed principal, the case could hardly have admitted of a doubt;
and I think it makes no difference that Wilson and McLay were
the agents, while Wilson, McLay and Hamilton were the undisclosed principals.
If the view which I have taken of the facts and the law applicable to them is correct, it is not necessary to look upon Wilson,
McLay and Hamilton as co-contractors; but, if they are looked at
in that light, I must say that the case of King v. Hoare appears
to me to have been decided upon satisfactory grounds. It is the
right of persons jointly liable to pay a debt, to insist upon being
sued together. If there are three people so liable, and the creditor
sues two of them, and those two make no objection, the creditor
may recover judgment against the two; but if he afterwards -*ue.
the third person, the latter may justly contend that the three
should be sued together. It is no answer to him to say that the
other two had been sued and had made no objection, for the objection is his, and not that of the other two; nor is it any answer to
him to say that whatever he pays on the judgment against himself
he may be allowed in account with the others, because he may
fairly require, with a view to his right of account or contribution,
to have the identity and the amount of the debt constituted and
declared in one and the same judgment with his co-contractors.
If then, when the third debtor is sued and requires that the othez
two should be j ined as parties, the creditor has to admit that he
cannot join the )ther two, because he has already recoverea judg-
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ment against them for the same cause of action, that is equivalent to
saying that he has disabled himself from suing the third person in
the way in which the latter has a right to be sued.
It has been suggested that, assuming King v. Hoare to have been
rightly decided, the law as there laid down has been altered by the
Judicature Acts, and by the abolition of the plea in abatement. I
cannot agree in that suggestion. I do not think that the Judicature Acts have changed what was formerly a joint right of action
into a right of bringing several and separate actions. Although
the form of objecting, by means of a plea in abatement, to the nonjoinder of a defendant who ought to have been included in the
action is abolished, I conceive that the application to have the person so omitted included as a defendant ought to be granted or
refused upon the same principles as those on which a plea in abatement would have succeeded or failed. In this case the judgment
was obtained before those acts came into operation, and if that
judgment became pleadable in the action against Hamilton, I cannot see how he can be deprived of his defence by such operation.
If that is Hamilton's position, I cannot agree that the doctrines
of equity with regard to partnership debts .make any difference.
No doubt in many cases and text-books we find the expression that
a partnership debt is in equity joint and several ; but that is a
compendious expression, and must be interpreted with reference to
what were the functions of a court of equity as to partnership
debts. The only interposition of the court with regard to such
debts took place in the administration of the assets either of the
partnership or of a deceased partner. When a member of a partnership died, the debts became in the eye of a court of law the
debts of the survivors; but on the other hand the survivors had in
a court of equity the right to say, as against the estate of the deceased partner, that his representatives should not withdraw any
part of the partnership, property until all the debts were paid or
provided for. If a court of equity were administering the assets
of a deceased partner, it would ascertain his liabilities to the partnership, and for this purpose it would ascertain the debts due from
the firm at the time of his death. From this the transition was
easy to giving the creditors of the partnership a direct right,
through the surviving partners, of coming for payment against the
assets of the deceased partner; and from this again the transition
:was easy to the expression that partnership debts, in the view of a
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court of equity, are joint and several, not meaning that the court
altered a legal contract, but that in order, before distributing
assets, to administer all the equities existing with regard to them,
the court would go behind the legal doctrine that a partnership
debt survives against the surviving partners only, and would give
the creditors the benefit of the equity which the surviving partners
might have insisted upon. This is clearly expressed by Lord
ELDON in -z parte Williams, 11 Yes. 3, and if I read his expressions it will be unnecessary to comment upon the numerous cases
which have been cited during the argument. Lord ELDON said:
"Among partners clear equities subsist, amounting to something
like lien; the property is joint, the debts and credits are jointly
due, they have equities to discharge each of them from liability,
and then to divide the surplus according to their proportions;
* * * but while they remain solvent, and the partnership is going
on, the creditor has no equity against the effects of the partnership, but when he has got them into his hands, he has them by
force of the execution, as the fruit of the judgment, clearly not in
respect of any interest he had in the partnership effects while he
was a mere creditor, not seeking to substantiate or create an interest
by suit. There are various ways of dissolving a partnership:
effluxion of time, the death of one partner, the bankruptcy of one,
which operates like death, or, as in this instance, a dry, naked
agreement that the partnership shall be dissolved. In no one of
these cases can it be said that to all intents and purposes the partnership is dissolved, for the connection still remains until the affairs
are wound up. The representatives of a deceased partner, or the
assignees of a bankrupt partner, are not strictly partners with the
survivor or the solvent partner; but still in either of these cases
the community of interest remains that is necessary until the
affairs are wound up, and that requires that what was partnership
property before shall continue for the purpose of a distribution,
not as the rights of the creditors, but as the rights of the partners
themselves, require; and it is through the operation of administering the equities, as between the partners themselves, that the
creditors have that opportunity, as in the case of death it is the
equity of the deceased partner that enables the creditors to bring
forward the distribution." I should imagine that the words "bring
forward" are inaccurately reported, but it obviously means "assist"
the distribution.
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If then this case is to be looked at as one where judgment has
been recovered against two out of three partners for a partnership
debt, it seems to me that, on the principle of King v. Hloare, the
judgment would be a bar at law to a subsequent action against the
third partner; and I know of no principle upon which a court of
equity could prevent that result by holding the debt to be several.
I am of opinion, in any view of the case, that the judgment of the
Court of Appeal was correct, and I propose to your lordships to
dismiss the appeal with costs.
Lord PENZAME.-The appellants advanced a large sum to the
respondent in conjunction with two other persons. The respondent had the full benefit of this advance to the extent of his
interest in the joint adventure, and, therefore, the a pellants have
acquired a legal, equitable and moral right to payment from him.
The sole defence of the claim of the appellants is this: that in accordance with a rule established about twenty-five years ago in
King v. .Hoare, which never received the sanction of an appellate
court, the appellants, by suing two out of the three partners, have
lost their remedy against the third. Before examining the technical grounds upon which this rule is based, I cannot forbear asking myself how far it is consistent with justice. What justice is
there in saying that when three persons are each individually liable
for a debt, an unsatisfied judgment against two of them should
extinguish the liability of the third? The most that can be said
is that, by bringing two actions, additional costs have been incurred. The joint contractors might reasonably insist that the
plaintiffs should not pursue their remedies in a vexatious manner,
and if two actions are without good reason brought, when one
would suffice, it may be that the extent of extra costs invoked
should be borne by the plaintiffs ; but that is a very different thing
from the extinction of the defendant's liability, which may be
equivalent to the plaintiffs' total loss of the debt. Even this consideration as to unnecessary costs can only apply in a case where
the plaintiff has, with his eyes open, chosen to sue two partners
first and the third one afterwards. It cannot apply to a case like
this, where the two first partners concealed the fact that the third
was interested in the adventure, and the appellants were ignorant
of that fact. That circumstance removes all blame from the appellants, and all semblance of justice from the defence now set up,
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vnd no argument has been adduced to show that the respondent
was prejudiced by the appellants' conduct, or that anything has
occurred to render him, in reason or justice, less liable to pay
the debt than he was at first. In this state of things I feel unwilling that your lordships should confer the sanction of the highest Court of Appeal upon a rule of procedure which, without
affecting to assert any just rights on the part of the defendant,
denies the aid of the law to enforce those of the plaintiff. Procedare is only the machinery of the law, the channel whereby it is
administered, and the means whereby justice is reached; and it
departs from its proper office when it is allowed to obstruct and
even extinguish legal rights, instead of facilitating them, and thus
governs where it ought to subserve.
With these observations I proceed to consider the case of King
The proposition that a cause of action which has never
v. -oare.
been before the court at all has become a res judicata is a startling one. The present plaintiffs have never before sued the present
defendant, or made any attempt to enforce the liability which he
now asserts, and yet they are met at the threshold of their suit
with the plea that the matter between them and the defendant
has already become a res judicata. The doctrine of merger is
quite intelligible. Where a seefrity of one kind or nature has
been superseded by another of a higher kind or nature, it is reasonable to insist that the party seeking redress should rest only upon
the latter. So when what was once a mere right of action has
become a judgment of a court of record, the judgment is a bar to
the original cause of action, for the reason given in King v. Hfoare
-namely, that "the judgment is a bar to the original cause of
action, because it is thereby reduced to a certainty, and the object
of the suit attained, so far as it can be at that stage, and it would
be useless and vexatious to subject the defendant to another suit
for the purpose of attaining the same result ; hence the legal maxim
-transit in rem judicatam; the cause of action is changed into
matter of record, which isof a higher nature, and the inferior
remedy is merged in the higher." This reasoning is satisfactory
on the assumption that the cause of action sued upon is the same
as that upon which judgment has been already obtained; but when
a man delivers goods or lends money to two or more partners, the
law implies a joint promise, the effect of which, as distinguished
from a joint and several promise, is this: that in case of death the
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debt can be enforced only against the survivor. If the further
legal effect of such a joint promise were this, that it could not constitute a cause of action against only one of the contractors, then
the reasoning in King v. Hoare would be unquestionable, for there
could be only one cause of action resulting, which would be a joint
one, and the cause of action, having been advanced to a judgment,
could not support a second action. But the cases do not establish
that ajoint promise has this effect. If a man who contracts with
two partners chooses to sue one only, and to allege a promise by
that one alone, he has a good cause of action which cannot be defeated by the defendant's proving that the promise was made by
him jointly with another person. If a joint promise by two persons were so different in law from a promise by only one person
that it could not be held to include a promise to each, and if it did
not in point of law give rise to a separate cause of action against
one, the defendant in such a case ought to be able to defeat the
plaintiffs claim by showing that the promise sued upon was not the
promise made, and that the latter did not give rise to a separate
claim. That was precisely what the defendant sought to do in
Rice v. Shute. There the plaintiff had been nonsuited upon the
ground that an allegation of a separate promise by the defendant
was not supported by a proof of a joint promise by the defendant and another, and that there was therefore a fatal variance. The
nonsuit was set aside, and Lord MANSFIELD'S language is instructive. He said: "To be sure, a distinction is to be found in the
books between torts and assumpsits, that in torts all the trespassers
need not be made parties, but in actions upon contract every party
must be made a defendant; many nonsuits, much vexation ani
great hindrance to justice, have been occasioned by this distinction;
it must have been introduced originally from the semblance of convenience, that there might be one judgment against all who were
liable to the plaintiff'q demand; but experience shows that convenience, as well as justice, lies the other way; all contracts with
partners are joint and several, every partner is liable to pay the
whole; in what proportion the others should contribute is a matter
merely among themselves; * * * it is cruel to turn a creditor round
and make him pay the whole costs of a nonsuit in favor of thedefeidant, who is certainly liable to pay his whole demand, and
who is not injured by another partner not being made defendant,
because what he pays he must have credit for in account with his
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partnership,* * * the defendant ought to plead in abatement ; he
must then say who the partners are; if the defendant does not
take advantage of it at the beginning of the suit and plead it in
abatement it is a waiver of the objection; he ought not to be permitted to lie by, and put the plaintiff to the delay and expense of
a trial, and then set up a plea not founded on the merits of the
cause, but on the form of the proceeding, * * * no injustice is
done to the defendant by allowing the plaintiff to recover, but great
injustice is done to the plaintiff by allowing the nonsuit to stand."
Therefore it is clear that, though the defendant in such a case may,
by means of a plea in abatement, compel the plaintiff to discontinue his action and bring a fresh one against both, there is yet a
good cause of action against him, which will sustain a verdict and
judgment if that course is not followed. It might happen that in
the case of a joint promise the plaintiff could bring two actions
pari passu, one against each joint contractor, and if neither of
them chooses to plead in abatement (which would not get rid of
their liability) both actions might go on to judgment, and in neither
of them, though the fact of the promise being joint only, and not
joint and several, appeared on the record, could the judgment be
declared to be erroneous. Now, if two judgments against two different defendants can be supported upon one joint promise, does not
that show that in reality two causes of action are involved in the
breach of such a promise? If so, the principle upon which King
v. Hoare was decided cannot be sustained, since it rests upon the
assertion that the joint promise gives rise to only one cause of
action. The creditor's real position appears to be this: he has a
cause of action against each debtor separately, or against both
together, subject to a plea in abatement. That plea affirms (not
that the plaintiff has no cause of action, or that his cause of action
is barred, but) that the plaintiff is bound to pursue his remedy in
another form of proceeding. That plea is thus described in Chitty
on Pleading, 7th ed., p. 462: "Whenever the subject-matter of the
plea or defence is that the plaintiff cannot maintain any action at
any time, whether present or future, in respect of the supposed
cause of action, it may, and usually must, be pleaded in bar; but
matter which merely defeats the present proceeding, and does not
show that the plaintiff is for ever concluded, should, in general, be
pleaded in abatement (from the French abattre); the criterion or
leading distinction between a plea in abatement and a plea at bar
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is that the former must not only point out the plaintiff's error, but
must show him how it may be corrected, and furnish him with
materials for avoiding the same mistake in another suit in regard to
the same cause of action, or, in technical language, 'must give the
plaintiff a better writ.'" By such a plea a joint contractor sued
alone could insist upon the plaintiff bringing his action against
both; but it is obvious that such a right can only be exercised, on
the part of both, by the one who is first sued. If one of the two
allows his liability to be enforced in a separate action, it is too late
for the other, if sued, to plead in abatement, for he cannot "give
the plaintiff a better writ." The conduct of the co-contractor, in
allowing the plaintiff to go on to judgment against him alone, has
rendered a joint action against the two impossible; the plaintiff
has no longer a joint promise upon which to sue, the promise of the
one having passed into resjudicata; and therefore the technical
grounds upon which King v. Hoare is founded are, in my opinion,
neither sufficient nor satisfactory. Moreover, when the Court of
Queen's Bench, in Bice v. SW7hute, determined, contrary to the rule
previously established, that a joint promise of several might give
rise to a separate action against one only, they destroyed the basis
upon which King v. Hoare is founded-namely, that the second
action is brought for the same cause as the first.
Passing from mere technical views, and regarding this rule of
procedure in the light of convenience and fitness to promote the
ends of justice, there is even less to be said for it. The rule is
unbending and indiscriminate. It permits no exception in a case
where one or more of several partners may be abroad, in which
case the plaintiff must either postpone his action till they are all
within the jurisdiction, or bring it at once at the cost of losing the
responsibility of those who are in the country; and there is no
exception possible for a case like the present, for the plaintiff could
not sue all the partnets together, being ignorant that the defendant
was one of them. In the first case the rule impedes and obstructs
justice; in the second case it denies justice altogether. It is true
that rules of procedure must be framed on general considerations,
though they may work hardship in individual cases, and that when
a rule is once established, those who practice the law must be
assumed to be aware of it, and to frame their proceedings accordingly; but the rule ought to be such as can be acted upon, and a
rule that upon a joint promise all partners must be sued jointly
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cannot be acted upon by one who does not know of the existence
of some of the parties liable, and then it becomes a trap and pitfall which the creditor has no means of escaping.
[Here follows a discussion as to the effect of the Judicature Act
upon the doctrine of King v. .Hoare, after which the opinion concludes as follows.]
I will not occupy your lordships' time by considering the vieiv
which ought to be taken as to the authorities in equity. I willingly adopt the opinion of those of my noble and learned friends
who are more competent than I am to read those decisions aright;
but for the reasons I have given I think that the judgment of the
Court of Appeal ought to be reversed.
Lords RATHERLEY, O'HAGAN, SELBORNE, BLACKBURN and
GORDON delivered opinions concurring with the Lord Chancellor.
Judgment affirmed.
In America, also, the common-law
rule is generally considered to be that a
judgment, though unsatisfied, against
one of two merely joint (and not joint
and several), debtors, is a bar to a subsequent suit against both on the same
cause of action. The short reason being that the plaintiff in such action
must show at the trial, an existing joint
liability in both defendants, or he can
prevail against neither. If, therefore,
the plaintiff has by any act released or
discharged one of such joint defendants
from his original liability, he has, at
common law, thereby released and discharged both. And a prior judgment
against one, though still unsatisfied, has
so far merged or extinguished the original cause of action, that no second suit
can afterwards be maintained thereon
against the same judgment debtor; and
consequently cannot be brought against
the same debtor and another jointly.
This was abundantly settled in this country long before King v. Hoare arose in
England in 1844. See Ward v. Johnson, 13 Mass. 148 (1816); WVillings v.
Conseua, 1 Peters C. C. 301 (1816);
Williams v. McFall, 2 S. & R. 280
(1816); Penny,v. Martin, 4 Johns. Ch."

566 (1820); Robertson v. Smith, 18
Johns. 459 (1821); Smith v. Black, 9
S. & R. 142 (1822); Beltzhoover v. The
Commonwealth, 1 Watts 126 (1832);
Afoale v. Hollins, 11 Gill &J. 11 (1839);
Taylorv. Claypool, 5 Blackf. 557 (1841);
Pierce v. Kearney, 5 Hill 82 (1843);
IVardv. Motter, 2 Rob. 536 (1843).
It is worthy of note that this question
had arisen and been correctly decided in
no less than ten different American tribunals before it had first presented itself
for direct adjudication in the mother
country. And the subsequent decisions
have generally followed on the same
Mann v. MAclulty, 2 Gilm. 355
side.
(1845); Sloo v. Lea, 18 Ohio 279
(1849); How v. Kane, 2 Chandl. 246
(1850); Stearns v. Aguirre, 6 Cal. 180
(1856); Brown's Adn'r. v. Johnson, 13
Gratt. 650 (1857); Kingsleyv.Davis, 104
Mass. 178 (1870); Cowleyv. Patch, 120
Mass. 137 (1876), and many other cases.
It is true the Supreme Court of the
United States, in 1810, and while Chief
Justice MAnsHALL was at its head, made
a contrary decision in Sheehy v. Mandeville, 6 Cranch 253 ; but it is equally true
that this decision, thoughstill followed
in some states (Watson v. Owens, 1 Rich.
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L. 113; Union Bank v. Hodges, 11 Id.
480; Nichols v. Cheairs, 4 Sneed 232,
and perhaps others), has been not only
generally disapproved in the state courts,
but has also been finally overruled in the
same tribunal which pronounced it. See
M3ason v. Eldred, 6 Wall. 236 (1867).
The same result follows in wholly separate suits; for, if a creditor recovers
judgment separately against one joint
debtor, as one partner in a firm, all being known, he cannot subsequently sue
the other joint debtor separately; for the
original cause of action is discharged.
Benson v. Paine, 2 Hilt. 552 ; Peters v.
Sanford, 1Den. 224 ; Nicklausv. Roach,
3 Ind. 78 ; Olmstead v. Webster, 4 Seld.
413; ierce v. Kearney, 5 Hill 82.
But, of course, if debtors are jointly
and severally liable, an unsatisfied judgment against one is no bar to a subsequent action against the other, notwithstanding some decisions to the contrary.
By suing one separately, the creditor
makes no election not to sue the others
separately. But the converse is not
equally true. For if a debt be joint as
well as several, a creditor who recovers
judgment against bothjointly, cannot, as
some think, afterwards sue either one
separately, although his first judgment is
ansatisfied, for he has made his election
to consider his contract joint and not several. Douwney v. Farmers' Bank, 6-c., 13
S. & R. 288. And if he first recovers
judgment against one separatelyhe can not
afterwards sue the whole jointly. Bangor Bank v. Treat, 6 Greenl. 207 ; Yelv.
26; 1 Saund. 291f; 3P. Wins. 405. And
as he cannot have both a joint judgment
against all, and also a separate judgment
against each, it seems more exact to call
his contract joint or several, rather than
joint and several. But see Trafton v.
UnitedStates, 3 Story 646; UnitedStates
v. Cushmari, 2 Sumn. 426.
Thus far we have been speaking of
actions on contracts. In England, however, even in actions of tort, a prior judgment against one of two joint tort-feasors,
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though unsatisfied, is held to be a bar to
a subsequent suit against the other;
Broome v. Vooton, Yelv. 67 ; .Buckland
v. Johnson, 15 C. B. 145; Brinsmead
v. Harrison,L. R., 6 C. P. 584 (1871).
But this is undoubtedly contrary to the
American law, and contrary to principle.
Lovejoy v. M11urray, 3 Wall. 1 ; Livingston v. Bishop, 1 Johns. 290 ; Sheldon v.
Kibbe, 3 Conn. 214 ; Sanderson v. Caldwell, 2 Aik. 195; Elliot v. Porter, 5
Dana 299; K7ott v. Cunningham, 2
Sneed 204; Payev. Freeman, 19 Mo. 421.
The decisions of Hunt v. Bates, 7 R.
I. 217, and Wilkes v. Jackson, 2 Hen.
& Munf. 355, following Broomev. Wooton, are clearly wrong.
However, even in actions of tort, if a
plaintiff recover judgment and satisfaction against one of two joint wrongdoers,
he can no longer prosecute a suit against
the other, even for nominal damages and
costs; and notwithstanding the last suit
was commenced at the same time as, or
even before, the other. 2aragev. Stevens, 128 Mass. 254 (1880); Mitchell v.
Libbey, 33 Mte. 74 (1851); Ayer v. Ashmead, 31 Conn. 447 (1863). For in
this respectjudgment and satisfaction by
one wrongdoer extinguishes the cause of
action against the whole, as much as a
voluntary release under seal of one tortfeasor would do.
Whether the same result follows in actions upon contracts is not universally
agreed. Some courts hold that if two
separate actions be commenced at the
same time, against parties severally liable for the same debt-as the maker and
endorser of a note, for instance-and
the plaintiff takes judgment and satisfaction against one, he cannot prosecute his
suit against the other, even for nominal
damages and costs. Gilmore v. Carr, 2
Mass. 171 (1806); Farcell v. Hilliard,
3 N. H. 318 (1825) ; Maine Bank v.
Osborn, 13 Ale. 49 (1836); Foster v.
Buffum, 20 Id. 124 (1841).
On the other hand it is frequently held
that the plaintiff in such case, having

